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Asian Demographic Transition:  







We examine patterns in fertility during the demographic transition using a panel data set across 
25 Asian countries for 1975-2003. The adult female literacy rate is used as an instrumental 
variable for the endogenous female labor force participation rate, which has been unsolved in the 
population literature. The preliminary panel data analysis suggests that relative cohort size is 
significant in explaining the decline in fertility before controlling for simultaneity bias. This 
result, however, may be spurious. After considering the instrumental variables estimation in the 
panel data structure, the age structure variable no longer plays a dominant role in explaining 
declining fertility rates in many Asian countries. Systematic differences were found between 
East and South Asia. A policy implication in South Asia is that development may reduce fertility 
directly through increasing income rather than indirectly through a change in female labor force 
participation or urbanization. In East Asia, the indirect effects dominate.  
 
JEL classification: J13, P20 
Key words: Fertility, Easterlin hypothesis, Transition Economies, Relative Cohort Size, Age 
Structure 
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1. Introduction 
The theory of the demographic transition concerns the impact of economic development 
on fertility, mortality and population growth.   The process of development is posited to initially 
reduce both mortality and fertility. However, the fall in mortality is thought  to fall 
contemporaneously with the beginning of development while fertility is thought to fall only after 
a long lag. While transition theory is rich in suggested hypotheses about the empirical causes of 
this fertility decline, the theory itself rests on shaky empirical grounds in large part due to data 
limitations. Much of the aggregate evidence rests on the experience of western countries, which 
are thought to have completed this transition, in many cases several centuries ago. These data are 
mostly limited to birth and death rates that can not be connected to supposed socioeconomic 
explanatory variable. Data, regarding birth and death, for countries that might be currently 
undergoing this transition are limited and sporadic. Consequently, time series evidence that a 
demographic transition is occurring in developing countries is weak. In this paper, we use panel 
data for a region, Asia, to estimate models based on transition theory and to test key propositions 
underlying the theory of the demographic transition. 
In testing transition theory, we follow a framework considered by Macunovich (2000), 
who uses cross sectional data for developing countries. She extends the Easterlin hypothesis to 
countries that are still undergoing the demographic transition by arguing that it helps to explain 
the timing of the onset of fertility decline.
1 This paper examines the Easterlin hypothesis in the 
framework of developing Asian countries and also extends Macunovich in two ways. First, 
instead of the cross-sectional data used by Macunovich, we adopt a panel data structure with 
various ranges of income-levels among Asian countries. Second, we consider additional 
                                                 
1 For reviews of the literature on the Easterlin hypothesis, see Macunovich (1998), Pampel and Peters (1995) and 
Waldorf and Byun (2005).      4
explanations for fertility decline during the demographic transition such as the role of women’s 
labor force participation rate in determining fertility.  Since women’s labor force participation is 
often thought to be endogenous, and has been unsolved in the population literature, an 
instrumental-variables approach is taken for the panel data set.   
The paper progresses as follows. Section 2 examines the existing population literature 
concerning the Easterlin hypothesis both in advanced countries and in countries that have not 
completed the demographic transitions. Section 3 provides an overview of the transition in 
certain Asian populations and economies. Section 4 describes the data set and our models for 
fertility in transition economies, and discusses the endogeneity problem of female labor force 
participation which is regarded as a key variable.  Then, we discuss the empirical findings. 
Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. Population Models and Relative Cohort Size 
  Before discussing transition theory, we will briefly discuss the Easterlin hypothesis, 
which attempts to explain the fertility of populations within countries that have already 
undergone the demographic transition.  In the Easterlin hypothesis, the income of young adults 
relative to the income of their parents, when these adults were in their late childhood and early 
adolescence, is held to be a key determinant of fertility.  Easterlin (1968) argues that the tastes 
and aspirations of today’s adults are greatly influenced by the income of their parents in earlier 
years. A decline in their income relative to their parents’ earlier income will decrease fertility.  
The relative income of young adults is determined by a number of factors including the 
business cycle and the proportion of young workers to the labor force called relative cohort size   5
(RCS).
2  If younger and older workers are substitutes, this increase in the relative supply of 
younger workers will lead to a decrease in their relative income.  Swings in economic conditions 
were hypothesized by Easterlin to result in swings in birth rates due to the resulting swings in 
relative cohort size.  It was thought that these swings in births could result in demographic 
cycles, which in turn could result in business cycles extending into the indefinite future.   More 
recent evidence indicates that while relative cohort size does have a negative impact on fertility 
in developed countries, this impact is not nearly as large as earlier research focusing on the US 
would suggest (Jeon and Shields, 2005).   
Macunovich (2000) extends the Easterlin hypothesis in order to apply it to both 
developed and developing countries.  She argues that the RCS influences the timing of fertility 
decline in the demographic transition.  Before applying the Easterlin hypothesis toward 
explaining fertility decline in the demographic transition, she first considers some key features of 
transition theory. When the theory of the demographic transition was first formulated, it relied 
heavily on functionalism (See Thompson, 1929 and Notestein, 1949).  Mortality rates before the 
transition were high.  Any viable society needed to encourage high fertility in order to offset this 
high mortality.  Social norms and mores, which encourage high fertility, are developed.   
Industrialization and the resulting modernization of a society are thought to first reduce mortality 
because of higher income and better medical technology.  Fertility remains high because social 
norms and mores are developed in earlier epochs of high mortality when high fertility was 
necessary for society’s survival.  However, society will adjust over time to the lower mortality 
rates by developing new norms and mores consistent with lower mortality.  This process will 
eventually cause fertility to fall.  One key feature in driving this adjustment is thought to be the 
                                                 
2 Some earlier studies, such as Wachter (1975), constructed estimates of relative income from current and past levels 
of income.  The recent literature has focused on RCS as being the Easterlin variable.   6
declining need for high fertility as a source of social security because of declining infant and 
child mortality.  A second key feature is thought to be urbanization, which increases the net costs 
of raising children and changes the unit of production from family to firm.  Hence, 
modernization would initially cause an increase in population that, if it persisted long enough 
could eventually become large enough to threaten the rising economic prosperity of the society.  
Eventually, however, the population could stabilize at a larger, but more prosperous level, if the 
pace of this transition were rapid enough.  The pace of fertility decline in the demographic 
transition is an important empirical question and whether it could be quickened by policy 
measures, such as providing more education for females is important for public policy.    
While transition theory implies that fertility will eventually decline with modernization, it 
does not necessarily imply that the pace of this decline and the timing of its onset are sufficiently 
large enough or early enough to assure the future prosperity of society.  Hence, an understanding 
of when and how rapidly fertility will decline and how it will respond to policy measures 
becomes crucial for population policy.
3 Macunovich (2000) extends the Easterlin hypothesis to 
explain the timing of the onset of the demographic transition within a supply and demand 
framework.  At the initial stage of the transition, modernization results in higher income and 
falling mortality, creating an excess supply of surviving children.  Parents may recognize the 
existence of this excess supply, but still will not take any action to reduce births.  Macunovich 
argues that the timing of the onset of fertility decline depends on both the duration and the 
magnitude of the excess supply of births.  Initially, the excess supply largely comes from the 
                                                 
3 In transition theory, the lag length between declining mortality and declining fertility is largely due to the time it 
takes for the norms and mores of society to adjust to the new needs of society brought about by lower mortality.  
Theories of the demographic transition have explained the lag between declining mortality and declining fertility in 
numerous ways.  This lag is thought to be potentially long because both individual decisions as to the utility 
maximizing number of children and the social norms, mores and institutions that frame this decision must change 
for fertility to decline in any substantial way.   7
decline in mortality. Eventually, however, RCS, defined as the ratio of persons 15-24 years old 
to those who are 15-59 years old, begins to rise due to the increased probability of survival 
through childhood.
4  If the Easterlin hypothesis is applicable to the economies of developing 
countries, this reduces the relative income of young adults resulting in an increase in the excess 
supply of births.  Once this excess supply reaches some critical level parents begin to plan the 
size of their family and take action to reduce fertility.   
The decline in mortality would, with a fifteen year lag, begin to increase RCS.  The 
mechanism by which RCS affects fertility would be slightly different in developing countries, 
undergoing the demographic transition, than in developed countries that have already completed 
the transition.  In developed countries, increases in the supply of young workers causing 
crowding in the entry-level job markets, which suppress the relative wages of young adults.  In 
developing countries, this labor market crowding may not suppress wages for the following 
possible reasons.  First, there may not be well functioning labor markets.  Wage rates might be 
set more by tradition and subsistence requirements within a dualistic labor market than by market 
forces.  Second, the government might follow a high wage policy to protect government workers 
and other clientele of the ruling elite.  However, a higher RCS would still place economic stress 
on young adults through higher entry-level unemployment and less access to land.   
 
3. The demographic transition in Asia   
                                                 
4 Relative cohort size, the proportion of younger workers to older workers in the labor force, is central to the 
Easterlin hypothesis, which concentrates on explaining swings in fertility for countries that have already undergone 
the demographic transition.  There have been numerous studies of the Easterlin hypothesis for various countries and 
for various periods of time.  These studies have almost exclusively been case studies of single countries that have 
already undergone the demographic transition.  Exceptions to these single country studies are Gauthier and Hatzius 
(1997) and Jeon and Shields (2005), which use panel data for industrialized countries.  Another exception is 
Macunovich (2000), which uses cross sectional data for a single year.     8
The regional area of Asia is chosen primarily due to the significant size of its population 
and its increasing economic power over the world economy. Many of the world’s most populous 
nations are located in Asia.  Both China and India have over a billion people, Indonesia has over 
200 million, and Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Japan have over a hundred million. Most of these 
countries have experienced dramatic economic booms since the 1950’s. Another reason for 
studying Asia is that it consists of countries at various stages of the demographic transition. 
Some countries are pre-transitional and have not experienced any fertility decline.  Others 
witnessed the onset of fertility decline during the time period being studied.  Still, others began 
the decline before 1975, while others completed the transition before 1975.  Hence, the results 
will reflect a variety of demographic experiences. Fertility in Asia, as a whole, has fallen 
dramatically since 1975.  Almost all of Asia has started or completed the demographic transition 
from high fertility to replacement fertility (Caldwell, 1996).  Hence, Asia is an effective case 
study for analyzing the pace of fertility decline.   
Asia differs from other developing regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America, in terms of its acceptance of active government roles in family planning.  This 
acceptance of active family planning comes in part from differences in religion, culture, and 
development experience.  One reason why family planning is more acceptable in Asia is that the 
major religions in Asia are Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. These religions differ from 
Christianity, particularly Catholicism, in that they do not support a tradition of opposition to 
contraceptive methods and family planning.  This opposition emerged in Catholicism, according 
to Noonan (1966), from a confusion of contraception with infanticide.  A second source for the 
acceptability of family planning in Asia comes from higher population densities with respect to   9
arable land and other natural resources coupled with some major famines.
5  A third reason for the 
acceptability of family planning is the perception by government in some countries, particularly 
China and India, that rising populations pose a development problem.  These governments acted 
on this perception with consistently implemented efforts to gain popular acceptance of birth 
limitation.   
We will turn to a discussion of fertility and family planning for sample countries in Asia.
6  
First, a well-known feature in Chinese population policy is the One-Child policy, initiated in 
1979 by Chinese political leader Deng Xiaoping. Previously, Chinese government officials took 
overpopulation problems seriously in food supplies, housing, education and employment,
7 but 
early attempts at limiting the number of births were not successful because of the long-held 
cultural belief that having many sons signals luck and future prosperity. The One-Child policy 
limits couples to have only one child by imposing financial fines, exerting pressure to abort a 
pregnancy, and even forced sterilization accompanying second or subsequent pregnancies.
8 This 
policy, however, was strongly resisted by rural residents and unfortunately it stimulated sexual 
discrimination against girls. Although the one-child policy ensures a better chance of supporting 
                                                 
5  Slogans such as “later, longer, and fewer” were widespread. They were meant to encourage a later start in 
childbearing, longer intervals between births, and fewer children on completion of family building (Crook 1997, p 
141). Pressure for family planning did not develop as early in the land abundant regions of Latin America and 
Africa.   
6  The decline in the fertility rate is universally caused by socio-economic development factors such as rapid 
urbanization, improvement of female status through educational opportunity and economic participation, and 
decreasing infant mortality rates. Also other factors include nutrition and health improvement and in addition 
changing values in number of children, life style, family structure, marriage, family role, and supporting the elderly.  
7  In the 1950s, the communist regime strongly encouraged population growth since labor-intensive works were 
planned and executed by the government, such as building infrastructures including massive dams. Their slogan was 
“our population is our strength”. Thus, China experienced policy changes from welcoming population growth to 
aggressive birth control program. See more in Crook (1997, Pages 140-146). 
8 All couples living in urban areas of mainland China are required to have no more than one child. But, families in 
most rural areas are often allowed to have two children, if the first child is female and the spacing of the second 
child is delayed. Another exception goes to most ethnic minority groups who are subjected to different fertility rules. 
Couples were induced to sign a document making this pledge and they were rewarded with certificates, financial 
subsidies such as work points used for commodity trade, a cash reward for sterilization, priority access to urban 
housing space (with disincentives on having more than two children).   10
a single child, there were fears of losing the only child due to nutrition-related diseases and 
poverty. The credibility of offered incentives by government was low. Thus, the one-child policy 
shows the limitation of government policies in creating demographic changes. Instead, economic 
conditions prevailed in the fertility decline, and Chinese policies emphasizing later marriage, the 
spacing of births in the 1970’s and contraceptive use in the early 1980’s dramatically reduced the 
fertility rate in China.   
Although fertility in Japan has declined over the past sixty years, the main sources of 
fertility decline changed dramatically in the mid 1970’s. The fertility decline before the mid-
1970’s is mainly due to reduced marital fertility, which was caused by an increase in the number 
of abortions, increased use of contraception and value changes in gender roles in family life. In 
contrast, delayed marriage has been a principle factor since the early 1970’s, due to women’s 
rising education level and their employment. This decline in fertility has caused the Japanese 
population to be the oldest in the world, although a variety of population policies and programs 
have recently been implemented to promote fertility by both central and local governments.  
The fertility rate in Korea declined to a level far below the replacement level within a 
short span after 1960. This momentous transition in Korea was achieved mostly by government 
sponsored family planning programs. It also was attributed to the increase in the proportion of 
single women, the changing attitude of women concerning child birth and an increasing female 
labor force participation rate that was supported by the Korean government. The rapid decline in 
fertility, however, has caused negative social phenomena such as population aging, a labor 
shortage leading to an influx of foreign labor migrants and an increased financial burden of 
supporting the elderly.    11
One of the distinct characteristics in Indian society was that marriages were made at a 
very early age, leading to high fertility. Thus, female education is expected to reduce the planned 
number of births because it delays family formation as well as improves the self-confidence of 
women in the household decision-making process. Economic development along with public 
health programs (such as the reduction in malaria and small pox) lowered the infant mortality 
rate, and thus the accessibility to public health services reduced the fertility rate as well. Condom 
use and male sterilization, which shifts the fertility responsibility for fertility control to men, 
were widely provided at subsidized prices and aggressively advertised by the government. 
Pakistan, a neighboring country, was a pioneer among Asian countries in adopting an official 
family planning program in 1965. The mortality rates already declined considerably in the 1950s, 
and the country experienced considerable modernization and improvement in the standard of 
living. Although Islam encourages early marriage, contraception (or even abortion) is not clearly 
prohibited but its use remains unpopular.
9  Government-sponsored programs such as putting 
economic incentives on birth control or disincentives on having large family were not effective 
in Pakistan.  
Other countries in Asia have experienced notable changes in fertility and have differing 
concerns. For example, in Singapore the government has taken a selective pro-natalist position 
which is targeted to increase the fertility rate among educated Singaporeans.
10 The dominant 
factor in rapid decline of fertility in Thailand is usage of contraception that has doubled from 
1975 to 1996.
 11  Sri Lanka has undergone a fertility decline beginning in the early 1960’s and 
recently marriage ages have dramatically risen to a level well beyond those of neighboring 
                                                 
9  See Sathar (1993) and Crook (1997, p 149). 
10 Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand (2003, P 9) provides examples of the selective pro-natalist position in Singapore, 
such as giving priority in primary school registration to children of graduate mothers; income tax relief for qualified 
mothers, matchmaking activities for graduate singles.  
11 See Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand (2003, P 4) for details.    12
countries and, thus, Sri Lanka becomes the only South Asian country to reach the replacement 
fertility level. Since births to single women virtually do not occur in Indonisia, the fertility 
patterns are the product of two variables, the proportion of married and marital fertility rates. The 
fertility decline in Bangladesh, despite being a Muslim country, was due to policy changes to a 
clinic-based delivery from the doorstep delivery of family planning services (causing cost 
savings and thus providing a wider range of services); both increasing availability (and high 
usage) of contraception and continuing urbanization reduced the demand for a high number of 
children, particularly for sons.
12   
 
4. The Data and Model 
  Both the validity of the Easterlin hypothesis in developing countries and hypotheses 
regarding the demographic transition and fertility are considered. The data are from the World 
Bank’s 2005 World Development Indicators. In this study, we examine fertility in a panel of 
Asian countries for the years 1975-2003. The total fertility rates for 25 Asian countries (17 East 
Asian and 8 South Asian) are shown in Table 1. Data are not available for every country for 
every year as seen in Table 1a. The total fertility rate (TFR) is available for at least 24 countries 
in years 1977, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2003. For these countries, the average 
TFR fell from 4.55 to 2.67. Table 1b shows the average TFR for each country.  Hong Kong,  
Japan, Macao, Singapore and South Korea had averages at or below replacement and had hence 
completed the demographic transition. Only seven countries had average total fertility rates at 
five or above. 
    The model to be estimated has TFR as the dependent variable.  The independent 
variables consist of RCS plus variables commonly thought to be important in the demographic 
                                                 
12 See Caldwell and Caldwell (2003) for details on Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.   13
transition.  These variables are real per capita income (Income), the urbanization rate (Urban), 
and the labor force participation rate of women ages 14-64 (Flabor), which is a variable related 
to the status of women.
13 Relative cohort size (RCS) is defined as the ratio of the size of the 
younger generation (ages 15-29) over the size of all the generations (ages 15-65).
 14 Relative 
cohort size is a cyclical variable representing systematic changes from an underlying trend. The 
basic model can be written with the fixed effect  i s  as 
it i it it it it it u RCS FemLabor Urban Income F + + + + + + = ε α α α α α 4 3 2 1 0 ) 3 (  
 
This model, which consists of these variables explaining fertility, is used to test the validity of 
the Easterlin hypothesis for Asian countries.  The variables are available for the panel data study 
of the paper.  There are, however, many observations missing in several important variables for 
the transition economies where some of the variables are not reported for every year. 
Each country has a different national environment in its labor market, in its social 
security net and in economic policies. So, a mere replication of the experience of developed 
countries may not be expected to apply to developing countries. We attempt to incorporate the 
unobserved information through a panel data analysis with various spectrums of countries in 
Asia.  
The standard method in empirical cross-country studies is to estimate regression 
equations with ordinary least squares (OLS) which assumes that the omitted variables are 
independent of the regressors and are independently and identically distributed. Such estimation, 
however, can create problems of interpretation if country-specific characteristics are not properly 
considered. If those omitted country-specific variables (both observed and unobserved) correlate 
                                                 
13 Infant mortality is another important variable, but due to the data limitation the variable is dropped. 
14 RCS for the current year is found by dividing the current size of the population aged 30-65 into the populations 
aged 0-14 fifteen years ago.   14
with the explanatory variables, then OLS produces biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. 
When using a panel data analysis, however, the fixed-effect model may produce unbiased and 
consistent estimates of the coefficients.
15 Furthermore, the endogeneity issue has been discussed 
in previous literature, for example, Pampel (1993, footnote 14) and Jeon and Shields (2005). 
That is, the fertility rate is influenced by female labor force participation, and vice versa.
16 Jeon 
and Shields (2005) compare the two different model specifications, with and without female 
labor force, and the impact of the Easterlin effect is confirmed in both specifications in spite of 
endogeneity issues.  
The results of panel data analysis, assuming implicitly no endogeneity problem, are 
shown in Table 2. Only country fixed effects are considered but not time fixed effects because of 
the irregularity of the time between observations. For the whole Asian data, the fixed effects 
model is preferred by the Hausman test to the random effects model. The female labor variable 
and urban population variable are statistically significant, but age structure and income are not 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Furthermore, we consider two sub-areas, 
East and South Asia. By the Hausman test, the random effects model is preferred for East Asia 
where both higher female participation and higher urbanization reduce fertility rate but the age 
structure increases fertility, which seems hard to believe. In contrast, the Hausman test selects 
the fixed effects model for South Asia, which includes richer model specifications and all of 
them are statistically significant and negative. That is, female labor participation, age structure, 
income and urbanization would reduce the fertility rates.  
                                                 
15 Section 3 reports differences in government attitude toward family planning and contraceptive prevalence through 
different Asian countries. The panel structure with country-specific unobserved components mostly accounts for 
these differences.  
16 Pampel (1993, p 511) suggests that the high female labor force participation rates depresses the effect of relative 
cohort size on fertility, which partially explains the declining association between relative cohort size and fertility 
over time. Female Labor Force is used instead of the female labor force participation rate because it filters out 
changes in over all labor force participation rates resulting from changes in age structure and other factors. 
   15
In summary, without considering the simultaneity problem, we may conclude that female 
labor participation reduces the fertility rate in Asia as a whole, and also in two sub-areas, East 
and South. Age structure increases the fertility rate in East Asia, but reduces it in South Asia. 
Income reduces the fertility only in South Asia; in contrast, the urbanization reduces the fertility 
rate not only in all of Asia but also both in East and South Asia.  
Solving this endogeneity problem caused by the interdependence of the total fertility rate 
with female labor force participation necessitates finding an appropriate instrumental variable.
17 
It is not easy, in practice, to find any instrumental variables for labor force participation, which 
leads to serious data limitations in the developing countries. However, Table 3 illustrates a 
suitable instrumental variable using the adult female literacy rate measured as the percentage of 
literate females ages 15 and over. The female literacy rate is a proxy for the labor market 
opportunities of women. Note that in four of the countries, Hong Kong, Japan and the two 
Koreas, no data on female literacy are reported. These countries are excluded from the estimation 
for Tables 3 and 4.
18  The random effects models are preferred by the Hausman test, and 
correspondingly in their first random-effects regressions in Table 3, the adult female literacy 
rates are significant. Thus, female literacy is a possible instrumental variable for the female labor 
participation but the signs of this variable are different.
19 For East Asia, the impact of adult 
female literacy is positive on the female labor participation, but for South Asia it is negative.  
Thus, we have effectively solved the endogeneity problem that female labor participation poses. 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Wooldridge (2003, chapter 15). 
18 As a robust check, we tried to fill Singapore’s female literary rates as a proxy for those in Hong Kong, Japan and 
the two Koreas. The results are shown in Table 5, with 98 observations. The age structure variable and the 
urbanization variable become insignificant, contradicting the Eastern hypothesis and population transition theory. 
One explanation is that the post transitions countries are dominating the sample, which makes the variables 
insignificant. Other possible explanation might be that female literacy rates may not be a good proxy for women’s 
labor market opportunities in these countries, while the data limitations do not allow us to find another instrumental 
variable.  
19 Adult female literacy rate affects fertility through labor force participation, but also through a variety of other 
mechanisms such as improving contraceptive knowledge, household bargaining, and aspirations and so on.     16
In both Asia and East Asia with instrumental variables, age structure does not show any 
relationships with the total fertility rate, which is not consistent with the results in Table 2 and 
the Easterlin hypothesis in Jeon and Shields (2005) that used a data set of higher income 
countries. Female labor participation, which was replaced with the instrumental variable adult 
female literacy rate, shows a negative relationship with the total fertility rate and is significant in 
both the whole Asia and East Asia. In contrast, in South Asia the preferred random effects model 
indicates that only income is statistically significant in reducing the fertility rate. This result is 
dramatically different from the results in Table 2, mainly due to solving the simultaneity bias 
problem.  
In summary, urbanization and female labor force participation, which were unpredictable 
without the use of the adult female literacy rate as an instrumental variable, now exhibit a 
sensible negative relationship with the fertility rate for East Asia. But the income variable and 
age structure variables do not exhibit any statistical relationship with the total fertility rate. Thus, 
policy tools to reduce the fertility rate would be improved through providing better job and 
education opportunities for females and through modernization by urbanization. In the 
meantime, South Asia indicates that only higher income may reduce the fertility rate, and thus 
improving the living standards is the only policy tool to reduce the fertility rate, if necessary. 
Age structure is not relevantly related with the total fertility rate. Note that an important variable, 
infant mortality, was not included in our analysis, but our preliminary analysis (not shown here) 
indicates a positive and significant co-movement with the fertility rate.
20 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
                                                 
20 Some Asian countries allow substantial emigration. If emigration is selective in favoring younger people or a 
specific gender, then the relationship between fertility and age structure may be severely compromised.     17
Our empirical results support the usefulness of the transition theory in analyzing fertility 
decline in Asia and suggest a method for analyzing fertility in other regions. These results and 
their policy implications are, however, more complex than suggested by transition theory. Key 
variables influence fertility differently in South Asia versus East Asia. These differences and the 
reasons for them should be kept in mind when formulating policy. 
The results support the view that endogeneity problems may exist even in developing 
countries when estimated models include women’s labor force participation rate as an 
explanatory variable in estimating fertility.  Thus, instruments related to the status of women, 
such as the adult female literacy rate, need to be employed to solve the endogeneity problem. 
Therefore, women’s education plays a key role in explaining fertility decline in East Asia, but 
not in South Asia. It is expected that women’s education might also be an important fertility 
variable in some areas such as Latin America and Africa, which is one of our on-going research 
projects.  
The results for the instrumental variable model are striking.  They do not support 
Macunovich (2000)’s contention that RCS plays a similar role in explaining fertility both in 
society’s undergoing the demographic transition and in post transitional societies.  RCS has a 
relationship with fertility before controlling for the endogeneity problem, but RCS is no longer 
significant after solving the simultaneity problem.  In Asia, it may be a false result due to this 
problem that the onset of fertility decline might be abrupt once RCS increases due to changes in 
the second phase of the transition. The results also have clear policy implications when it comes 
to population policy.  A clear picture emerges that improving the economic status of women 
through education and through women’s labor force participation will reduce fertility in East 
Asia.  Increasing urbanization to reduce fertility may be a long wait indeed because the   18
magnitude of this coefficient is small.  It is the policy choice to provide more education and labor 
force opportunities that drives the fertility transition and not the usual transition story of 
urbanization coupled with the declining need for children as a source of social security driving 
the transition. In South Asia, direct economic growth, rather than change of the female labor 
force or the social infrastructure, promotes population transitions. Thus, the different policy 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for the total fertility rates 
 
(a) by year        (b) by country 
year  Mean  Std  Freq          Mean  ranking  Std  Freq 
      dev           Country Names     by mean  dev    
1976  2.304 0.575  3   1  Brunei  3.200  11  0.662  8 
1977 4.554  1.736  24   2  Cambodia  4.995  19  0.932  8 
1978  2.050  0.477  3    3  China  2.354 6 0.370  15 
1979  1.957 0.306  3   4  Hong  Kong,  China  1.241  1  0.350  17 
1980  2.009 0.460  3   5  Indonesia  3.161  10  0.774  9 
1981  2.141 0.709  3   6  Japan  1.583  2  0.184  28 
1982 4.311  1.789  24    7  Korea, Dem. Rep.  2.381  7  0.317  8 
1983  1.704 0.136  2   8  Korea,  Rep.  1.813  5  0.424  11 
1984  1.891 0.324  3   9  Lao  PDR  5.797  24  0.769  8 
1985  1.687  0.103  2    10  Macao,  China  1.663 3 0.503  8 
1986 1.961  0.681  3   11  Malaysia  3.594  13  0.555  8 
1987 3.875  1.707  24   12  Mongolia  3.781  15  1.187  9 
1988 1.808  0.209  2   13  Myanmar  3.770  14  0.864  8 
1989 2.371  1.011  4   14  Philippines  4.030  17  0.639  8 
1990 3.593  1.615  24    15  Singapore  1.679 4 0.175  27 
1991 1.676  0.396  4   16  Vietnam  3.225  12  1.217  11 
1992 3.503  1.610  25    17  Thailand  2.416 8 0.717  11 
1993 1.554  0.261  4   18  Afghanistan 6.962 25 0.139 5 
1994 2.873  1.921  5   19  Bangladesh  4.063  18  1.251  10 
1995 2.000  0.671  7   20  Bhutan  5.448  21  0.408  4 
1996 2.067  0.911  5   21  India  3.827  16  0.848  8 
1997 2.992  1.346  24   22  Maldives  5.450  22  1.204  8 
1998 1.793  1.035  4   23  Nepal  5.059  20  0.821  9 
1999 1.996  1.563  5   24  Pakistan  5.571  23  0.937  10 
2000  1.428  0.442  3    25  Sri  Lanka  2.602 9 0.644  8 
2001  1.222  0.259  3       Asia  3.104     1.633  264 
2002 2.685  1.197  24       East Asia  2.604     1.326    
2003 2.671  1.192  24       South Asia  4.734     1.473    
Total 3.104  1.633  264               
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Table 2.  Panel Data Analysis with Endogenous Female Labor Participation  
 
 
   Asia  East Asia  South Asia 
   FE  RE FE  RE FE RE 
Constant     6.813     6.094     11.284 
      (4.24)     (3.14)     (4.24) 
      [2.85]     [3.31]     [3.06] 
Female labor  -0.123  -0.099  -0.054  -0.077  -0.056  -0.086 
participation (-3.54)  (-4.29)  (-0.99)  (-2.52)  (-2.21)  (-3.26) 
 Rates  [-2.09]  [-2.80]  [-0.54]  [-2.95]  [-3.01]  [-1.23] 
Age structure  1.425  4.229  3.122 3.885 -10.175  -1.593 
   (0.75)  (2.34)  (1.78)  (2.28)  (-3.78)  (-0.36) 
   [0.55]  [2.14]  [1.37]  [2.09]  [-3.88]  [-0.18] 
Income 0.036  0.054  0.030  0.037  -0.947  -1.786 
 ($1,000)  (1.11)  (1.70)  (0.98)  (1.32)  (-4.59)  (-5.19) 
   [1.08]  [2.00]  [0.87]  [1.44]  [-6.21]  [-3.71] 
Urban -0.070  -0.045  -0.052  -0.039  -0.224  -0.011 
Population (-5.97) (-6.19) (-4.42)  (-5.51)  (-11.88) (-0.49) 
   [-3.04]  [-4.97]  [-2.98]  [-5.23]  [-11.61]  [-0.27] 
no of obs  138  138  98  98  40  40 
R2-within 0.508 0.486 0.512  0.504  0.943  0.598 
R2-between 0.508  0.539  0.487 0.499 0.007 0.958 
R2-oversall 0.488  0.534  0.459  0.498  0.144  0.731 
Hausman test  16.53  4.97  72.46 
p-value 0.000  0.174  0.000 
Decision FE  RE  FE 
 
Note: The dependent variable is total fertility rate (births per woman). Of the independent 
variables, female labor force is percentage of total labor force, pppgdp is for PPP GDP per capita 
and urban population is calculated from the percentage of urban population. The values in the 
parentheses are t-statistics and those in the brackets are Huber/White/ Sandwich robust t-
statistics within country correlation.  
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Table 3. Relevance of Adult Female literacy Rate as an Instrumental Variable 
 
   Asia  East Asia  South Asia 
   FE  RE FE  RE  FE  RE 
Constant     44.505     40.738     8.657 
      (8.98)     (9.24)     (0.52) 
      [7.74]     [6.07]     [0.20] 
Adult Female  0.124  0.149  0.050  0.134  -0.233  -0.124 
Literacy rate  (2.29)  (3.73)  (1.05)  (3.45)  (-1.99)  (-2.02) 
   [0.85]  [2.11]  [0.63] [1.92] [-0.84]  [-1.31] 
Age structure  -21.737  -23.436  -10.003  -15.494  15.817  54.275 
   (-2.96)  (-3.34)  (-1.79)  (-2.71)  (0.97)  (2.08) 
   [-1.69]  [-2.52]  [-1.39]  [-2.90]  [0.80]  [0.78] 
Income -0.200  -0.277  0.106  -0.134  7.647  8.571 
 ($1,000)  (-0.93)  (-1.43)  (0.65)  (-0.88)  (4.84)  (2.62) 
   [-0.49]  [-1.25]  [0.57]  [-0.90]  [2.76]  [1.83] 
Urban  0.016  -0.036 0.118 -0.0002 0.052  -0.637 
Population (0.22) (-0.69) (2.08) (-0.01) (0.30) (-5.05) 
   [0.10]  [-0.50]  [1.51]  [-0.00]  [0.18]  [-2.19] 
no of obs  90  90  57  57  33  33 
R2-within 0.519 0.515 0.776  0.729  0.728  0.340 
R2-between 0.070  0.145  0.282  0.041  0.004  0.573 
R2-oversall 0.070  0.115  0.150  0.000  0.016  0.547 
Hausman test  1.81  9.07  31.27 
p-value 0.612  0.028  0.000 
Decision RE  FE  FE 
Note: The dependent variable is female labor force participation rate.  Adult female literacy rate 
is measured as the percentage of literate females ages 15 and above.  
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Table 4. Instrumental Variable Regressions in Panel Data  
 
   Asia  East Asia  South Asia 
   FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE 
constant     19.129     19.406     7.176 
      (3.73)     (3.12)     (1.07) 
Female labor  -0.768  -0.305  -0.804  -0.292  0.177  0.228 
participation (-2.18)  (-3.74)  (-0.85)  (-2.59)  (1.23)  (1.21) 
Age structure  -17.385  -3.153  -7.111  -3.412  -11.485  -16.783 
   (-1.83)  (-0.69)  (-0.69)  (-0.84)  (-2.53)  (-1.21) 
Income -0.099  0.001  0.103 -0.022 -0.002  -3.060 
 ($1,000)  (-0.62)  (0.01)  (0.45)  (-0.26)  (-2.72)  (-3.00) 
Urban -0.001  -0.048  0.054  -0.041  -0.173  0.167 
population (-0.02)  (-3.41) (0.33)  (-2.69)  (-3.90)  (1.41) 
no of obs  90  90  57 57 33 33 
Hausman test  3.88  0.44  3.10 
p-value 0.275  0.931  0.377 
decision RE  RE  RE 
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Table 5. Robust Check – models including South and North Korea, Hong Kong and Japan  
 
(A) The first stage regression 
   Asia  East Asia 
   FE  RE FE  RE 
constant     44.505     40.738 
      (8.98)     (9.24) 
      [7.74]     [6.07] 
Adult Female  0.118  0.135  0.079  0.118 
literacy rate  (3.63)  (4.68) (2.97)  (4.51) 
   [1.44]  [2.11]  [1.12]  [1.93] 
Age structure  -14.226 -15.482  -4.868 -7.209
   (-3.05)  (-3.36)  (-1.44)  (-1.98) 
   [-1.48]  [-1.85]  [-0.79]  [-1.44] 
Income -0.067  -0.091  0.083  0.026 
Unit-$1000 (-0.80) (-1.10)  (1.40)  (0.42) 
   [-0.39]  [-0.65]  [0.68]  [0.26] 
Urban 0.016  -0.021  0.060  0.0002 
population (0.44)  (-0.66) (2.97)  (0.01) 
   [0.25]  [-0.46]  [1.05]  [0.00] 
no of obs  138  138  98  98 
R2-within 0.515 0.510 0.708  0.689 
R2-between 0.037  0.086  0.386 0.194
R2-oversall 0.072  0.123  0.168  0.019 
Hausman test  5.84  31.25 
p-value 0.120  0.000 
decision RE  FE 
 
(B) The second stage regression 
   Asia  East Asia 
   FE  RE  FE  RE 
constant     19.129      14.070 
      (3.73)     (2.26) 
Female labor  -0.594  -0.305  -0.278  -0.258 
participation (-3.39)  (-4.56)  (-1.45)  (-1.69) 
Age structure  -6.661  -1.168  1.708 1.725
   (-1.59)  (-0.41)  (0.76)  (0.84) 
income 0.030  0.030  0.059  0.055 
Unit-$1000 (0.57)  (0.73)  (1.44)  (1.57) 
Urban -0.018  -0.049  -0.027  -0.030 
population (-0.70) (-5.31) (-1.09)  (-1.61) 
no of obs  138  138  98  98 
Hausman test  3.76  0.08 
p-value 0.289  0.994 
decision RE  RE 
Note that we fill missing values of female literary variable for South and North Korea, Hong 
Kong and Japan with those of Singapore    26
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